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Abstract 
The OECD electricity sector has witnessed significant institutional restructuring for the past three decades. 
As a consequence, many power generation utilities now act as unregulated companies that technically 
compete to sell power on an open market. This paper analyses the performance in term of cost efficiency for 
electricity generation in OECD power sector while accounting for the impact of electricity market structures. 
We employ the short-run cost function in which capital stock is treated as a quasi-fixed factor input. 
Empirical models are developed for the cost function as a translog form and analysed using panel data of 25 
countries during the period 1980 to 2009. Our results show that cost efficiency scores as well as their 
ranking are sensitive to the choice of model specification. We show that it is necessary to model latent 
country-specific heterogeneity in addition to time-varying inefficiency. The estimated economies of scale 
are adjusted to take account of the importance of the quasi-fixed  capital input in determining cost 
behaviour, and long run constant returns to scale are verified for the OECD generation sector. The research 
findings suggest there is a significant impact of electricity market regulatory indicators on cost. In particular, 
public ownership and vertical integration are found to have significant and sizable increasing impacts on cost, 
thereby indicating policy lessons on the desirable ways to implement structural electricity generation 
reforms.  
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Cost Efficiency and Electricity Market Structure: A Case Study of OECD Countries 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Due to the liberalisation and deregulation wave in the electric power industry across most of the countries in 
the world, electricity generation companies, especially in the several OECD countries now act as 
unregulated companies that technically compete to sell power on an open market. An overview of 
experiences in several OECD countries where generation segment has largely been deregulated while 
transmission and distribution continue to be regulated is provided by Al-Sunaidy & Green (2006) 
andJoskow (2008). One compelling reason for the deregulation of electricity generation as against direct 
economic regulation is the lack of natural monopoly in this segment2 which is the common feature of 
transmission and distribution. This policy choice along with horizontal restructuring of the segment have 
been accompanied by increased number of competing generators to mitigate market power and to ensure 
that wholesale markets are reasonably competitive. The recent history of the electricity generation industry has 
been characterised in many countries by privatization, deregulation and liberalization. Although these changes are 
often given the convenient overall titles of deregulation or open markets, these can be misleading and these changes 
can be significantly different in scope and meaning. It should be clear that while such policy induced changes can 
occur together, they do not mean the same thing3.  
By privatization, we mean the conversion of state owned or publicly owned utilities  into investor owned utilities. By 
deregulation, we mean the decision by government to step back from the day-to-day determination of pricing and 
investment decisions. The alternative to direct government control is to appoint a regulatory agency which is 
independent but accountable to government and which is responsible for regulating the natural monopoly aspects of 
the industry which arise from the importance of economies of scale and scope. By liberalization, we mean the opening 
of the market to new entrants and the permission of incumbents to demerge into competing firms or alternatively to 
merge or even exit the industry. The model here is of a competitive industry where entry and exit are relatively free 
and of low cost, thereby reducing the need for extensive or intensive regulation by a NRA. 
These forms are not synonymous with each other and may occur to varying degrees in the power generation industry 
at different times. In Scandinavian countries publicly owned utilities exist within a deregulated and liberalised market 
and in Germany there are many municipal level publicly owned utilities within a deregulated and partly privatised 
market for power networks. 
 
The generation of electricity involves using different ranges of technology and fuel. To a great extent, fossil-
fuel-fired boilers producing steam for turbine generators remain the major electricity generation technology. 
                                                          
2 Electricity production is conventionally segmented into generator, (HV) transmission, (LV) distribution and retail supply. 
3 We are grateful to a referee for encouraging us to emphasise these distinctions. 
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These generation technologies are characterised by quasi-fixed inputs which implies that they cannot be 
immediately adjusted. Another important characteristic of electricity infrastructures is that its current 
technology is a consequence of investment decisions made in the past and whose effects resonate over 
various periods4. Nelson (1985) argues that the nature of the generation facilities in the electric power 
industry could result in the firm not operating on the economic expansion paths. Since estimations of 
economic of scale in this industry have been based on long-run cost which implicitly or explicitly invoke the 
assumption of cost minimization, this assumption will be violated. The need to account for such quasi-fixed 
inputs is therefore important in estimating scale economies to avoid imprecise and biased cost function 
parameters. 
 
Analysis of electricity generation cost structure and efficiency is made more imperative in the understanding 
of the behaviour of power generators in relation to environmental and social welfare aspects. Electricity is a 
non-storable commodity in which requires balancing of power generated and consumed on an electric grid 
on a second by-second basis. The ability of these generators to adjust their generating capacity, and hence 
the output at will many times is constrained and could be slowed down in the presence of suboptimal 
capacity factors like cost associated with such adjustments, administrative regulation, external factor and 
time. Therefore, cost structure analysis may help to reduce technical and economic inefficiency and enhance 
improving social benefit. This could perhaps necessitate mergers of power generators who are not operating 
optimally in order to reduce operation costs since success of competition rests on the size and number of 
generators in the market.  
 
One of the major contributors of global greenhouse gas emissions is electric power generation, accounting 
for 42% the global energy related CO2 emissions and its associated externalities in 2011 (IEA, 2013). While 
focusing on how efficient power utilities are in generating electricity, it is also crucial to understand how 
well they manage to avoid unnecessarily large production levels of these bad outputs. Carbon emission 
produced by electricity generator are endogenous in the production process since they are considered a joint 
output of electric power plants alongside with electricity generation output. Reducing these environmental 
costs is associated with decreasing generation output at existing input levels or increases in input costs at 
desired output levels. Power utilities are concerned that commitment to reducing these bad outputs would 
eliminate their profit margins and impede their competitiveness with other generators.  
 
To this end, this paper contributes to the empirical literature by assessing the cost efficiency and industry 
structure of OECD power generation sectors. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 
                                                          
4 See Díaz-Hernández, et al. (2014) for a similar discussion on ports infrastructure 
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presents the brief literature review and section 3 details the methodology used in this paper in order to 
estimate cost function and efficiency. Section 4 presents the data description and section 5 provides the 
result and discussion.  Section 6 presents the concluding remarks and policy recommendation. 
 
2. Literature review 
A large number of studies have attempted to investigate cost structure and efficiency in electricity industry 
as evidenced by the proliferation of the methodology. This underscores the growing discourse regarding 
deregulation of power sector and its attendant gains as advanced by proponents of market reform. 
Nevertheless, recent empirical findings have shown that cost function parameter estimates of electricity 
sector differ across many study dimensions such as methodology, data type, model specification, sample 
size etc. While most of these studies have been dominated by the conventional long run cost minimisation 
assumption, little attention has been given to sub optimality of capacity as a result of costly adjustment to 
time profile of electricity demand. For the handful that have considered cost estimation of the industry by 
taking into account the quasi-fixed input, there is no recognition of the multiproduct nature of power 
industry where emissions are assumed to be jointly produced with electric power. Most existing empirical 
applications of the short run cost which allows one to relax the assumption of cost minimization with respect 
to all inputs in electricity sector have used different functional form with translog functional function form 
being the most common specification.  
 
A search in the literature shows that cost function empirical analyses have been carried out for the different 
stages of the industry as each of these stages are marked by different levels of competition and regulation in 
varying degrees across countries (See Nelson and Wohar, 1983; Kaserman and Mayo, 1991; Nemoto et al., 
1993). Most of the articles on the generation stage of the industry are in the context of electricity industry in 
the U.S. which dates back to the work of Christensen and Greene (1976), using a translog total cost function 
to estimate scale economies of electric power generating firms. Other such as Nelson (1985, 1989), 
Kraustmaan and Solow (1988), and Hovde et al (1996) employ a variable cost function to estimate scale 
economies. Rhine (2001) estimate economies of scale for fossil fuel and nuclear fuel electricity generation 
using a variable cost function. The result shows that electric utilities are operating on the negatively sloped 
portion of the long-run average cost curve, indicating either slight economies of scale or no economies of 
scale. iNemoto et al (1993) also specified the variable cost function as a translog form using panel data of 
nine Japanese electric utility firms during the period 1981 to 1985. They found most firms experiencing 
scale economies in the short run but diseconomies in the long run, and certain degree of over-capitalization 
 
Some studies which include Considine (2000), Keith and Terrell, (2001), Maloney (2001), Hiebert (2002) 
and Rungsuriyawiboon and Stefanou (2007) used data on the steam electric power generation source to 
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estimate cost structures and the possible savings in the production costs for major investor owned utilities. 
Considine (2000) estimates short-and long-run marginal production cost and returns to scale and finds 
substantial short-run diseconomies of scale at high output levels. Keith and Terrell, (2001) use a Bayesian 
stochastic frontier model to measure cost efficiency, price elasticities, and returns to scale of 78 steam 
plants. Their results indicate that plants on average could reduce costs by up to 13% by eliminating 
production inefficiency. They show that most plants operate at increasing returns to scale, suggesting further 
cost savings could be achieved through increasing output.  Maloney (2001) applied a translog variable cost 
function to study electricity generation in the United States. The cost function is estimated using a two 
dimensional definition of capacity utilization and the result shows that both dimensions affect average cost, 
which generally declines as capacity utilization increases.  Hiebert (2002) finds increasing scale economies 
in both coal-fired plants and natural gas-fired plants with 20% and 12% degree of scale economies 
respectively. Rungsuriyawiboon and Stefanou (2007) show that most electric utilities underutilized fuel 
relative to the aggregated labour and the maintenance input, and overutilized capital in production. They 
concluded that states adopting a deregulation plan improve the performance of utilities in terms of the 
technical efficiency of variable inputs. 
 
More recent studies such as Wang, Xie, Shang & Li (2013) identify measures to improve the performance of 
China’s thermal power industry in view of cost efficiency. Assaf, Barros, Managi (2010) analyse and 
compare the cost efficiency electricity generation Japanese steam power generation utilities using the fixed 
and random effect Bayesian frontier models. The results show that total cost increases significantly with the 
input prices and outputs, with the exception of the price of labour and restricting CO2 emissions can lead to 
a decrease in total cost. Akkemik, (2009) estimates cost functions and investigates the degree of scale 
economies, overinvestment, and technological progress in the Turkish electricity generation sector for the 
period 1984–2006 using long-run and short-run translog cost functions. Estimations were done for six 
groups of firms, public and private. The results indicate existence of scale economies throughout the period 
of analysis, hence declining long-run average costs.  
 
Empirical studies on the cost structure for the transmission and distribution stages include the work of 
Kwoka (2005) which used quadratic cost function to examine whether mergers in the US distribution sector 
which appeared as a consequence of the reforms could enhance cost efficiencies. The findings reveal 
significant economies at low output levels, holding system size and customer density constant, but the cost 
gradient is otherwise modest. It also shows that the scale properties of the wires function are significantly 
stronger than those for the supply function performed by distribution utilities. Yatchew (2000) estimate the 
costs of distributing electricity using data on municipal electric utilities in Ontario, Canada. Their 
specifications comprise semiparametric variants of the translog cost function where output enters non-
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parametrically and remaining variables (including their interactions with output) are parametric. The study 
reveal substantial evidence of increasing returns to scale with minimum efficient scale being achieved by 
firms with about 20,000 customers while the large firm exhibit constant or decreasing returns. Giles and 
Wyatt (1993) estimate a total cost function from a sample of 60 New Zealand electricity distributors, 
reporting an efficient scale for a sales range of 500 to 3500 GWh. 
 
Burns and Weyman-Jones (1996) used cost frontier model to estimate efficiency change for 12 regional 
electricity distributions in the UK. They enumerate factors which determine costs such the maximum 
demand on the system, number of customers served (main determinants of distribution operating costs), the 
type of consumer, dispersion of the consumers, size of the distribution area, total kWh sold system security, 
length of distribution line and the transformer capacity. Their results indicate significant evidence of 
economies of scale. Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento, R. (2008) examine the cost-effectiveness of 
Finnish electricity distribution utilities employing several panel data stochastic frontier specifications of 
Cobb–Douglas and Translog model. The study points out the importance of the efficient use of the existing 
distribution network with the economies of scale results suggesting that firms could reduce their operating 
costs by using networks more efficiently.  
 
In two different studies of Swiss electricity distribution utilities, Filippini (1996) and Filippini and Wild 
(2001) using a flexible translog by introducing a quasi-fixed cost, representing the impacts of quasi-fixed 
distribution equipment and a linear average cost function find evidence of increasing scale economies 
throughout their sample of 39 and 59 utilities respectively. Filippini (1998) also show the existence of 
economies of density for most output levels for 39 Swiss municipal distribution utilities while economies of 
scale appear for small and medium-sized utilities with policy a recommendation for mergers among the 
utilities. Pollitt et al (2005) examine the relative performance of electricity distribution systems in the UK 
and Japan between 1985 and 1998 using cost-based benchmarking with data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) methods and suggest that the productivity gain in the UK electricity 
distribution has been larger than in the Japanese sector.  
 
Furthermore, some studies also provide empirical evidence for the whole industry. Arcos and De Toledo 
(2009) examined eleven Spanish vertically integrated utilities and find the presence of economies of scale, 
the effect of technological progress and the differences in the efficiency of the different firms within the 
market. They concludes that the Spanish electrical utility industry was not, in fact, characterized by 
economies of scale during this period, but witnessed a great improvement in efficiency within that period. 
Fraquelli and Vannoni (2005) investigate cost savings from generation and distribution of Italian electric 
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utilities. The study finds evidence of both multi-stage economies of scale and vertical economies and 
suggests that a complete divestiture policy would entail efficiency losses. 
Considering the theoretical supposition of deregulation which assumes exhaustions of economics of scale 
for generation5, there is a need to further investigate this argument from the point of view of cross country 
analysis. Thus the present study contributes to existing literature in threefold. First, unlike previous studies 
which are centred on country level analysis, the present study focuses exclusively on cost estimates from 
generation segments in OECD countries with broader geographical coverage to enhance a better 
understanding of the cost structures among these estimates in OECD countries electricity generation and 
attributes of studies reporting these estimates in the individual countries in the market economies. Second, 
we investigate the impact of electricity market structure on cost efficiency by incorporating electricity 
reform regulatory index in our analysis. Third, unlike previous studies, we extend our model to include 
multiproduct function by including carbon emission as part of the outputs of electricity generation in order 
to estimate and provide reliable information on some cost characteristics of generation such as cost 
complementarity, non-jointness etc. 
 
3. Methodology 
An electricity utility produces a vector of outputs including desirable products generated in the production 
process, and undesirable products, i.e. that part of production that constitutes environmental pollution. The 
output of electricity during the production process is dependent upon inputs such as stock of capital from 
generating capacity, labour and primary fuels.  
 
Let 𝐲𝐲 𝜖𝜖 ℜ+𝑚𝑚 represents an m-dimensional vector of outputs produced from an n-dimensional input vector 
𝐱𝐱 𝜖𝜖 ℜ+𝑛𝑛 . Outputs are determined exogenously in order to meet market demand. The production process can 
be characterised by an additional variable t, which denotes the level of technology and which uses time as a 
proxy.  
 
Estimating the structure of a cost function requires an explicit assumption regarding the state of equilibrium,  
long run when all inputs are variable and short run when the capital stock may be difficult to adjust. 
Adjustments in the capital stock are relatively costly and power utilities are obliged to respond to all the 
demand, and thus they typically dispose of excess capacities to account for seasonal and unexpected demand 
variations. Power utilities can be affected by investment constraints, regulation or indivisibilities which 
could make immediate adjustment difficult in the short run. These situations reflect the quasi-fixity of 
                                                          
5 Landon(1983) and Joskow (1996) for a discussion of the assumption of technology and cost structures of different segments of the power 
sector. 
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capital stock. Faced with this situation, the economic decision of the firm in the industry will, at any given 
moment, be to minimise cost by only employing the optimal quantities of the easily adjustable variables 
inputs (i.e. labour and fuel), given the existing levels of the quasi-fixed input (i.e. capital stock). Therefore, it 
is important to recognise this fact and differentiate between variable and quasi-fixed inputs when evaluating 
cost efficiency of electric power utility. To account for this peculiar quasi-fixity characteristic of capital 
stock, we employ a short-run equilibrium model which assumes capital as quasi-fixed input while the utility 
uses the most efficient level of other variable inputs.  
 
Therefore, we proceed by differentiating capital stock as input which is a quasi-fixed input in the short run 
and variable in the long run, and symbolise it with 𝑧𝑧𝑜𝑜 , with input price: 𝑤𝑤0. Then, following the arguments 
in Friedlander and Spady (1981) and Braeutigam and Daughety (1983), we can write the long run cost 
function, with all inputs including capital stock treated as variable, in the form 
 
𝐶𝐶(𝒚𝒚,𝒘𝒘,𝑤𝑤0 𝑡𝑡) = min
𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎,𝐱𝐱 {𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑧𝑧𝑜𝑜 + 𝒘𝒘′𝐱𝐱 ∶ 𝑓𝑓(𝐲𝐲, 𝐱𝐱, 𝑧𝑧𝑜𝑜 , 𝑡𝑡) = 1 }                                                                                 (1) 
 
In the short-run,  the capital input available to the firm is assumed to be fixed, implying that the firm 
attempts to minimize cost conditional on a given plant size. The short run cost function is therefore: 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠(𝒚𝒚,𝒘𝒘, 𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎, 𝒕𝒕) = min𝐱𝐱{𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑧𝑧𝑜𝑜 + 𝒘𝒘′𝐱𝐱 ∶ 𝑓𝑓(𝐲𝐲, 𝐱𝐱, 𝑧𝑧𝑜𝑜 , t) = 1 }                                                                                
(2) 
The envelope theorem confirms that the long run total cost defines the envelope of the short run total cost 
functions. When the firm minimizes the variable cost, 𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉, of producing a given output by optimising the 
fixed stock of capital, 𝑧𝑧0, then the long run cost function is defined as the envelope of the short run cost 
functions. In other words when  𝑧𝑧0 is the same as the optimal level of capital that would be chosen in the 
long run, then 
 
𝐶𝐶(𝒚𝒚,𝒘𝒘𝟎𝟎,𝒘𝒘, 𝒕𝒕) =  min𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎 𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉(𝒚𝒚,𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎,𝒘𝒘, 𝒕𝒕)  + 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑧𝑧𝑜𝑜   =  𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠(𝒚𝒚, 𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎,𝒘𝒘, 𝒕𝒕)                                        (3) 
 
Equation (3) above is the tangency condition between the short and long run total cost curves. Thus, the 
envelope theorem implies that for any slight deviation of the level of the fixed input above or below the 
optimal level, there will be no reduction in total cost. 
 
The short run cost function 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠(𝒚𝒚,𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎,𝒘𝒘, 𝒕𝒕), differs from the used long run cost function because the price of 
capital appears as an explanatory variable in the long run cost function, while the stock of capital appears as 
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an explanatory variable in the short run cost function. The short run cost function, 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠(.) for electric power 
generation depends upon two variable factor prices: fuel prices and labour prices, conditional upon 
predetermined levels of capital stocks 𝑧𝑧𝟎𝟎, electricity generation, y and the state of technology t. 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠(.) is non-
negative and non-decreasing in y, homogenous of degree one, non-decreasing, and concave in the variable 
factor input prices, and non-increasing and convex in the levels of quasi-fixed factors 𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎. 
Differentiating (3) at the point where 𝑧𝑧∗ represents the optimal value of fixed inputs which minimises the 
short run total cost, then 
 
�
∂𝐶𝐶(𝒚𝒚,𝒘𝒘𝟎𝟎,𝒘𝒘,𝒕𝒕)
∂𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎
�
𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎=𝑧𝑧∗
= 0 =  �∂𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉(𝒚𝒚,𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎,𝒘𝒘,𝒕𝒕)
∂𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎
�
𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎=𝑧𝑧
∗
+  𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜         (4) 
Rearranging Equation (4) gives the important interpretation of the shadow price of the capital input 
  �∂𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉(𝒚𝒚,𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎,𝒘𝒘,𝒕𝒕)
∂𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎
�
𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎=𝑧𝑧∗
=  − 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜             (5) 
 
Equation (5) implies that, in the long run equilibrium, cost minimisation is accomplished when variable cost 
saved by substituting the last unit of capital for variable inputs is equal to the price of capital,  𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜. This 
allows us to interpret the derivative on the left-hand-side of (5), i.e. the effect on the variable cost function of 
a change in the quasi-fixed input of capital as the negative of the shadow price of capital. If the derivative is 
expressed in log or elasticity terms then it corresponds to the negative of the shadow rate of return on 
capital. This is the core argument of Breautigam and Doherty (1984). 
 
 If  ∂𝐶𝐶
𝑉𝑉(𝒚𝒚,𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎,𝒘𝒘,𝒕𝒕)
∂𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎
  is less than −𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜 i.e. negative and greater in absolute value magnitude, it implies suboptimal 
capital whereas if  ∂𝐶𝐶
𝑉𝑉(𝒚𝒚,𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎,𝒘𝒘,𝒕𝒕)
∂𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎
  is larger than−𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜, it means excess capital.  There is a possibility of  
∂𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉(𝒚𝒚,𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎,𝒘𝒘,𝒕𝒕)
∂𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎
  being positive, implying over-investment in capacity generation and could potentially results in 
a situation where electric power utility does not operate at a long run efficiency position6.    
 
The shadow price of the quasi-fixed input is important for estimating the degree of  scale economies which 
is a long run parameter by definition.  Panzar and Willig (1977) show the measure of degree ray (or overall) 
scale economies, r, at output vector y from the multi-product firm is derived from the long run cost function 
as;  
 
                                                          
6 For a discussion of the interpretation of the enveloped conditions, see Cowing and Holtmann (1983). 
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𝑟𝑟 = 𝐶𝐶(𝒚𝒚,𝒘𝒘𝟎𝟎,𝒘𝒘,𝒕𝒕))
∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
𝑅𝑅
𝑟𝑟=1
=  1
∑ ℇ𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟
𝑅𝑅
𝑟𝑟=1
                                                                                                                           
(6) 
 
where, 𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑟𝑟 is the marginal cost with respect to the individual output, and  ℇ𝐶𝐶𝑦𝑦𝑟𝑟 are cost elasticities of 
individual outputs. If applied directly to the short run cost function, this measure is invalid as an estimate of 
the long run scale elasticity parameter. However, in the presence of a quasi-fixed input, Braeutigam and 
Daughhety, (1983) show that scale economies can be calculated from the short run cost function by 
adjusting the Panzar and Willig measure by the shadow price of the quasi-fixed input: 
 
𝑟𝑟 ∗= �1 − ∂ln𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠(𝒚𝒚,𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎,𝒘𝒘,𝒕𝒕)
∂ln𝑧𝑧0
� ∑
∂ln𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠(𝒚𝒚,𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎,𝒘𝒘,𝒕𝒕)
∂ln𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1�          (7) 
Where 𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎 = 𝑧𝑧∗ is the optimal level of capital stock in for a given output produced. Ray scale economies are 
present when the calculated value of 𝑟𝑟 exceeds one, while if 𝑟𝑟 equals one there are long run constant returns 
to scale and decreasing returns to scale if 𝑟𝑟 is less than one. Caves et al. (1981) also proposed an alternative 
approach of inferring economies of scale based on direct estimation of the variable cost function: 
𝑟𝑟 ∗= �1 − ∂ln𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉(.)
∂ln𝑧𝑧0
�  ∑ ∂ln𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉(.)
∂ln𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1�           (8) 
The scale economies in this case are based on the actual capital stock, rather than the optimal value of the 
fixed capital input. Scale economy estimates computed using the second method may not coincide with 
those derived using the first (Vita, 1990). The key point is that if the unadjusted Panzar-Willig estimator is 
applied in a variable cost estimation, the result will indicate only the curvature of the short run total cost 
function, which is likely in a capital intensive industry such as electricity generation to be much steeper than 
the curvature of the long run cost function. Consequently in evaluating scale economies is it critical that we 
make the adjustment for the shadow price of the quasi-fixed input. 
 
The studies on stochastic frontier cost (production) decomposes deviations from these frontiers into random 
noise and inefficiency terms while estimating efficiency based on the independent proposition of Aigner et 
al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977).  In order to investigate empirically cost inefficiency in 
electricity generation in OECD countries, we employ multi-product cost function model. We have the 
following stochastic frontier cost models with: 
  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝑓𝑓(𝒚𝒚, 𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎,𝒘𝒘, 𝒕𝒕)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                         (9) 
where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  is the cost for the ith OECD country national generation at the time t, i = 1,…25  and t = 
1,…30, 𝒚𝒚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector for the outputs, 𝒘𝒘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector for the factor prices, 𝒛𝒛𝟎𝟎𝟎𝟎𝒕𝒕 is a quasi-fixed input. Since 
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the mean of the variables are regarded as the expansion point, costs as well as outputs and factor prices are 
normalise by dividing the variables by their corresponding means. 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  represents one-side technical 
inefficiency, whereas 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 denotes two-sided convectional idiosyncratic error term with zero means and 
variance 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2. 
Several flexible functional forms have been proposed, which help to address the drawback associated with 
previous inflexible functional forms such as Cobb-Douglas based on constant elasticities of substitution 
criticized by Uzawa (1962)7. It is worth noting that these functional forms are not parsimonious (in terms of 
number of parameters) and more cumbersome to implement empirically8. The most popular and widely used 
specification of these flexible functional forms in stochastic frontier cost literatures has been translog form9.  
Using the transcendental logarithm functional form as an arbitrary second order approximation to the multi-
product cost function, we fit variable cost functions (i.e. a function for the minimum cost required to 
produce outputs given the input prices), 𝐶𝐶(𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧0,𝑤𝑤, 𝑡𝑡), for N countries over T periods. The condition that the 
cost function is homogenous of degree one in input prices is imposed by normalising cost and fuel price by 
the price of labour (this choice is suggested by the fact that the sample variance of the price of fuel exceeds 
that of the price of labour).. The estimated cost function is specified as follows: 
ln�𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ � = 𝛼𝛼0 + � 𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
ln(𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 12 � �𝛼𝛼𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑀𝑀
𝑛𝑛=1
𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
(ln(𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ln(𝑦𝑦𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)) 
+�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽−1
𝑗𝑗=1
ln�𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ � + 12��𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽−1
𝑗𝑗=1
𝐽𝐽−1
𝑗𝑗=1
�ln�𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ � ln�𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ �� 
+ � �𝛾𝛾𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽−1
𝑗𝑗=1
𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
�ln(𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ln�𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ �� + 𝛿𝛿1𝑡𝑡 + 12𝛿𝛿2𝑡𝑡2 
+ � 𝜃𝜃𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
ln(𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 𝑡𝑡 + �𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽−1
𝑗𝑗=1
ln�𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ � 𝑡𝑡 + 𝜋𝜋1 ln(𝑧𝑧0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 12𝜋𝜋2(ln(𝑧𝑧0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖))2 
+ � 𝜌𝜌𝑚𝑚𝑀𝑀
𝑚𝑚=1
(ln(𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ln(𝑧𝑧0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)) + �𝜎𝜎𝑗𝑗𝐽𝐽−1
𝑗𝑗=1
�ln�𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖⁄ � ln(𝑧𝑧0𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
             (10) 
                                                          
7 Uzawa (1962) proved that it is impossible for any functional form that exhibits constant elasticities of substitution to provide simultaneously 
the capability to attain an arbitrary set of elasticities.  
8 A functional form is parsimonious if it provides a second order approximation using a minimal number of parameters. See Fuss, McFadden, 
and Mundlak (1978) which argue that a growing number variables leads to more parameters estimates which exacerbate problems of 
multicollinearity. Also, when the sample is small, excess parameters mean a loss of freedom and hence a loss in the precision of estimation. 
9 See Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1971, 1973) for discussion on the rationale for preference towards the translog functional form. 
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The cost function in (10) is estimated using three stochastic frontier estimation models that are different 
based on the assumptions imposed on the error term (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖), inefficiency and error term. These models are 
summarised Table 1, and explained below. 
 
Model I: TI is the time-invariant fixed effects model proposed by Schmidt and Sickles (1984) .The model 
specifies a firm-specific effect 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖, an independent randomly distributed intercept, and a random noise 
term 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 which isassumed to be identically and independently distributed (iid). The advantage of this model 
is that it avoids making any distributional assumption about the inefficiency term, and it permits the 
inefficiency term to be correlated with the regressors. The disadvantage is the inability to distinguish 
between time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and cost inefficiency as all time-invariant firm-specific 
effects are incorporated into inefficiency. A country i’s inefficiency is assumed to be interval between its 
estimated fixed effect  and that of the country on the frontier namely, the minimum estimated fixed effect. 
 
Model II, TFE is the true fixed effects stochastic frontier analysis of Greene (2005) which relaxes the 
restrictive assumption in model I by allowing time variation in the inefficiency term while enabling 
investigation of the impact of observed heterogeneity on cost and efficiency. If latent heterogeneity exists 
such as factors that beyond the firms’ control but may affect their costs and if not adequately accounted for, 
then all the time invariant heterogeneity will be pushed to the intercepts and finally into the inefficiency 
term leading to biased efficiency estimate. The unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity can be taken into 
account with conventional fixed or random effects in a panel data model. In order to distinguish external 
heterogeneities from cost efficiency, the “true” fixed effect model incorporates an additional stochastic term 
representing inefficiency. Model II addresses the time invariant heterogeneity by specifying separate 
intercept dummy variables for each unit in the sample and follows the asymmetric half normal distribution 
or the asymmetric exponential distribution for the cost inefficiency component and normal distribution for 
the error term. This model is estimated using Maximum Likelihood estimation. 
 
In model II, a time-invariant component of inefficiency has been omitted.  Model III, FWEC proposed by 
Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardbaker (2014) deals with the possibility of time-invariant inefficiency by 
separating time-invariant (persistent) inefficiency from time-invariant heterogeneity. The extended model 
includes separate four components; two which are stochastic inefficiency terms (residual and persistent 
inefficiencies) and other two are time invariant heterogeneity and idiosyncratic error term. This model is 
specified as follows; 
 ln𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑜𝑜 +  𝑓𝑓(𝐲𝐲𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′,𝐰𝐰𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖′) + 𝜋𝜋(𝐳𝐳𝟎𝟎𝒕𝒕) + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖                  (11)                                                     
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where 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖  are the random firm effects that capture unobserved time-invariant heterogeneities, 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 time-
invariant (persistent) inefficiency, 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is idiosyncratic error term and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the time-varying (residual) 
inefficiency. The overall cost efficiency is the given as the product of time-invariant (persistent) efficiency 
and time-varying (residual) efficiency. The consideration for model III becomes more relevant in the context 
of quasi-fixed input to the extent that inefficiency associated with this input may not be eliminated in the 
short run and tends to remain with the firm over time. This model is estimated using Pseudo-Maximum 
Likelihood methods originally suggested by Fan et al (1996) which involves a four step modelling 
procedure, in which the first step is the one-way random effects feasible generalised least squares estimator. 
The cost efficiency score for each country can be estimated from the conditional expectations proposed by 
Jondrow et al. (1982).  
 
 
Table 1 estimation 
models  
Specification  
Model 1 (TI) 
Schmidt-Sickles (1984) 
Model 2 (TFE) 
Greene (2005)  
Model 3 (FWEC) 
Kumbhakar-Lien-
Hardaker (2014)  
Error-component model 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖   𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Idiosyncratic error 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2) 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2) 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2) 
Time-invariant 
(persistent) inefficiency 
Yes   
Fixed Effects, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 
No Yes 
𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁+�0,𝜎𝜎𝜂𝜂2� 
Country-specific latent 
heterogeneity 
No Yes 
Fixed Effects, 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
Yes 
Random Effects, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 
Time-varying (residual) 
inefficiency 
No Yes 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁+(0,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2) or 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖~𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 
Yes 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖~𝑁𝑁+(0,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2) 
Inefficiency measure    
Persistent (time-invariant) 𝑢𝑢�𝑖𝑖 − Min�𝑢𝑢�𝑗𝑗� 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒      𝐸𝐸(𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖 |𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
Residual (time-varying) 𝑁𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)      𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
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4. Data description 
The analysis of cost structure and efficiency of electricity generation in OECD is hampered by paucity of 
data for the entire OECD countries. Data collected from different international databases for a period from 
1980 to 2009 covers only 25 countries. Years 1980 through to 2009 represent, respectively, the years which 
data are available for all the variables.  The data necessary for the cost estimation include the variable cost, 
the price of two variable factors i.e labour (L) and fuel (F); a quasi-fixed capital input (K) together with the 
quantity of electricity generated. Others include carbon emission, electricity reform index regulatory i.e 
entry barrier, vertical integration, public ownership and overall market reform, as well as the country-
specific heterogeneous variables.  
 
The input prices and variable cost were calculated as follows. The price of labour (𝑤𝑤1) is computed as the 
ratio of labour compensation10 and the number of people engaged obtained from EU KLEMS.  This is 
obtained in each country’s currency at current price, and converted to constant price by using value added 
price index (1995=100). These real local currency measures are then normalised into international units 
using purchasing power parity exchange rate from Penn World Table (PWT7.1). Fuel price (𝑤𝑤2) represents 
the price fuel used for electricity generation measured in dollars at current prices. It is obtained from energy, 
prices and taxes folder of International Energy Agency (IEA). The price is converted to constant price by 
normalising using price index price index (1995=100) from the World Development Indicators. Data on 
operating cost was calculated as the sum of labour and fuel expenditures. The number of people represent 
labour while fuel consumption inputs measured in kilotonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe), and includes all 
varieties of fuel utilised by the generation plants: coal, oil, gas, hydro, nuclear and biomass. As fuel input 
data are available in the same measurement units, we aggregated them into one indicator. This allows for the 
different fuel intensity of different generation technologies. The fuel consumption data is collected from 
International Energy Agency (IEA). 
 
As for the choice of the outputs, we consider both desirable and undesirable outputs that are jointly produced 
during electricity and heat production. The outputs are electricity generation (𝑦𝑦1) which represents the 
annual net electricity output generated by each country measured in gigawatt-hours and carbon emission 
(𝑦𝑦2) measured in million metric tons. Capital stock is measured in megawatt (MW) of installed capacity. 
Installed capacity is used as a proxy for the quasi-fixed stock of capital in our cost model. This is a 
consistent proxy of capital stock in line with relevant papers (See Jaraitė & Di Maria, 2012). Electricity 
generation and installed capacity are also obtained from International Energy Agency (IEA) while carbon 
emission is sourced from the World Bank Development Indicator. 
                                                          
10 The data represents labour compensation for utility i.e. water, gas and electricity as there is no available disaggregated for electricity sector. 
It is reasonable to assume that a substantial portion of the employment in the utility industry is actually attributable to electricity sector.   
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Besides the standard variables of proper cost estimation, we added electricity sector regulatory reform 
indicators in the model. The data were obtained from OECD. These include the sub indicators of reform 
process; namely entry barriers (𝑧𝑧3), public ownership (𝑧𝑧4) and vertical integration (𝑧𝑧5) and overall 
electricity market reform indicator (𝑧𝑧6).  These indicators range from 0 to 6, with   0 representing the fully 
open market in which entry barriers, public ownership and vertical integration are minimized and a score of 
6 is given to a closed market.  Or, as the OECD expresses it: “Scores vary from 0 (the most effective 
governance structure) to 6 (the least effective governance structure)”. Incorporating the variable into the cost 
frontier, costs are expected to increase with increasing restriction of the electricity market. A positive sign 
on the market reform variable means that cost rises as index rises from 0 to 6. Moreover, we added country-
specific heterogeneous variables in our analysis to account for possible shifts of frontier cost level. First, we 
consider electricity consumption per capita (𝑧𝑧1) which tends to strongly correlate with wealth of a country. 
We expect that countries with high per capita electricity consumption would experience increasing operating 
costs in order to meet electricity consumption. We also control for degree of industrialisation of each 
country which is measured by percentage of industrial output share of GDP. We expect a large proportion of 
industrial customers to increase operating cost in order to a balance industrial electricity demand with 
energy supply as customer can increase their power demand anytime.  
 
Finally, we included a time trend in the model, measured in years, so as to account for possible effects of 
Hicks neutral technological change with the expectation that costs are expected to diminish over time, all 
things being equal. For the estimation, we mean-adjusted all logged for each variable by taking the 
geometric means in order for the cost order coefficient in the model to be interpreted as elasticities at the 
sample mean. The descriptive statistics on the variables used in the empirical estimation are provided in 
Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive 
Statistics  
 
          
  Measurement Units No of Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Cost US $ (1995=100) 520 1.69E+07 4.31E+07 7497.12 4.31E+07 
Electricity generation GWh  520 370562.20 762132.50   903.00 4190541 
Carbon emission MMT 520     226.59 532.18       1.03   2732.80 
Price of labour US $ (1995=100) 520       52.36        46.51       0.65 540.48 
Price of fuel  US $ (1995=100) 520     274.70 331.53 5.40 2643.201 
Capital MW 520 90173.52 183543.00 1235.00 1026869 
Elect consumption per 
capita kWh per capita 520   6718.95 4013.51 1226.57 17319.23 
Industrialisation % of GDP 520       24.37 4.10 13.78 32.69029 
Entry barriers (0-6) 520         4.10 2.46 0.00 6.00 
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Public ownership (0-6) 520         4.28 2.17 0.00 6.00 
Vertical Integration  (0-6) 520         5.45 0.80 3.00 6.00 
Overall elect. Mkt. 
reform (0-6) 520         4.47         1.60 1.17 6.00 
 
5. Results and discussion   
We begin our analysis by running a pooled OLS based on the test proposed by Schmidt and Lin (1984) in 
order to confirm the presence of technical inefficiency. In the case there were no technical inefficiency, the 
error term would be distributed symmetrically around zero i.e.  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0   then  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, thereby 
invalidating the inefficiency assumption. The estimated skewness (3.66) and kurtosis (15.65) test for 
normality from the pooled OLS regression has the expected sign and confidently rejects the null hypothesis 
of normal residual11. Thus, the test result provides evidence for the presence of the one-sided error12. 
Furthermore, a series of hypothesis tests were conducted using log likelihood ratio tests. Table 3 presents the 
results of hypotheses tests that examined a number of restrictions.   
 
Table 3:  Likelihood ratio test 
     Null Hypothesis Test statistics Critical value Decision 
     (0.05 level)   
 Cobb-Douglas 
    𝐻𝐻0: all cross effects null 399.21 𝜒𝜒142 =23.68 Reject 𝐻𝐻0 
 Hicks neutral technical change 
    𝐻𝐻0: 𝛿𝛿1 = 𝛿𝛿2 = 𝜉𝜉1 = 𝜉𝜉2 = 𝜂𝜂kt 22.26 𝜒𝜒52 =11.07 Reject 𝐻𝐻0 
 Homotheticity 
    𝐻𝐻0: τ1 =  τ2 112.64 𝜒𝜒22 =5.99 Reject 𝐻𝐻0 
 
        
We test the translog specification against a Cobb–Douglas to confirm if the translog gives adequate 
representation of the cost structure, and the Cobb–Douglas frontier is rejected, Second, we test the 
hypothesis of Hick-neutral technological progress that technology change has no effect input augmenting 
and output demand effects. The hypothesis of technical bias in the translog cost function is also rejected. 
The homotheticity assumption which states that the level of output has no effect on the input ratios is also 
tested. We impose restrictions on the 2 parameters associated with interactions between input price and 
outputs. We reject homotheticity of the technology implying that input prices have significant impact on the 
scale economies through the cost elasticities of outputs . 
 
Table 4 shows the estimated parameters from the different specifications of the stochastic cost frontier. The 
first and third columns of results correspond to the fixed and random effects one-way panel model 
                                                          
11 Since our model is cost frontier function with composed error term, the distribution of the OLS residual skew to the right (positive) as 
against left (negative) for production function regardless of any distributional assumption 
12 The normality result is available.  
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respectively, while the second column corresponds to the true fixed effects model, TFE. On grounds of the 
likelihood function values and the significance of the coefficients, the TFE model is clearly preferable. The 
results in the third column permit derivation of both time-varying and time invariant inefficiency 
components with latent heterogeneity as well, but only the first step estimates are shown here, which 
correspond to the random effects version of the fixed effects model in column 1. Again, the precision of the 
coefficients is less convincing than the true fixed effects model in the second column and moreover the 
additional time-invariant inefficiency component is minimal. On all these grounds, the TFE model in the 
second column clearly performs best, and we focus our interpretation on these TFE results. 
Table 4 Estimation results: 
Translog estimation  (Cost) Model 1 FE Model 2 TFE 
Model 3 
FWEC-RE 
stage 1 only 
Determinants of  (Cost) in logged 
mean corrected format  
Fixed Effects 
for time-
invariant 
inefficiency 
without 
heterogeneity 
True fixed 
effects for 
heterogeneity 
with time 
varying 
inefficiency 
Four-way 
component 
model with 
heterogeneity, 
residual and 
persistent 
inefficiency 
generation 1.1538*** 1.1567*** 1.1871*** 
emissions 0.0362 0.0986*** 0.0346 
input price ratio 1.0279*** 1.0163*** 1.0232*** 
generation squared 0.2769** 0.4572*** -0.2680* 
emissions squared 0.0301 0.0635*** 0.0349 
generation-emissions interaction -0.1367 -0.3719*** -0.1141 
input price ratio squared 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0007 
generation-input price interaction -0.0682** -0.0408 -0.0985*** 
emissions-input price interaction 0.0084 0.0012 0.012 
time 0.002 0.002 0.0005 
generation-time interaction -0.0046*** -0.0057*** -0.0003 
emissions-time interaction -0.0019 0.0009 -0.0028* 
input prices-time interaction -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0009* 
capital -0.3201*** -0.3219*** -0.2877*** 
capital squared 0.2390* 0.2081* -0.2299* 
generation-capital interaction -0.3264 -0.4496** 0.6034** 
emissions capital interaction 0.0775 0.2062*** 0.0616 
input prices capital interaction 0.0424 0.0299 0.0627* 
Increased industrialization 
-0.0007 0.0004 -0.0014 
increased entry barriers 
0.0092 0.0024 0.0188*** 
increased vertical integration 
0.0351*** 0.0270*** 0.0421*** 
increased public ownership 
0.0486*** 0.0334*** 0.0717*** 
reduced overall market reform 
-0.0370** -0.0101 -0.0655*** 
constant -0.5325*** All FE*** -0.4908*** 
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Est. SE time invariant heterogeneity   0.3080*** 
Est. SE time invariant inefficiency 0.9352  0.0002 
Est. SE idiosyncratic error 0.0617 0.0275*** 0.0607*** 
Est. SE time varying inefficiency  0.0556*** 0.0281 
𝜆𝜆 = 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣⁄  n/a 2.0223*** 0.4636*** 
Log of likelihood function 705.481 739.814 n/a 
Notes: *,**,*** denote statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
 
We discuss several aspects of these results. First, the monotonicity conditions for the translog cost function 
are clearly satisfied with significant coefficients on the generation, emissions and input price terms. 
Generation and the input price are the dominant drivers of total costs with a statistically significant but low 
elasticity of cost arising from emissions handling. The direct impact of neutral technical progress is not 
significant but there is a significant interaction of technical progress and generation output. This reflects a 
common finding amongst international panels that it is input accumulation and output expansion that drives 
productivity over time rather than pure technical progress – see Adetutu et al (2016) for a similar finding for 
the BRICS economies. The presence of generation capital stock as a quasi-fixed input enables us to estimate 
the rate of return on capital from the negative of the reported cost elasticity. We see that at a statistically 
significant sample mean value of 0.3129 the return on capital in generation has been high over the sample 
period suggesting that producers have been undercapitalised and that expansion of generation investment 
was warranted compared with the cost of capital that has prevailed in most of the sample countries over this 
period. 
Of primary interest has been the role of regulatory reform and the progress in the product market regulation 
indicators computed by the OECD. In the first and third columns there is an indication that overall market 
reform has not reduced cost but this appears to be a spurious finding related simply to the country specific 
differences across the sample. When country specific latent heterogeneity is allowed for in the TFE results 
in the second column, which are already preferred for reasons of goodness of fit, it becomes clear that the 
overall market reform indicator is not statistically significant. In other words the overall reform effort is 
picked up by the heterogeneity of the countries in the sample; this should not surprise us because each of 
these countries has pursued different strategies in designing the regulatory oversight and ownership of the 
generation industry.  
 
On the other hand, two of the OECD’s product market regulation indicators are statistically significant even 
when country-specific heterogeneity is taken into account. These are vertical integration and public 
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ownership. Greater vertical integration and a greater degree of public ownership are statistically significant 
in raising generation costs in each of the estimated models. In the random effects model in the third column 
barriers to entry are also significant in raising generation costs. We can speculate on the reasons for these 
findings. Strong vertical integration  means that the generation companies are closely allied to the providers 
of transmission and distribution services. These are invariably in a natural monopoly position of market 
power so that some protection of market power from competitive forces could be transmitted back up the 
electrical power supply chain leading to the higher generation costs found in these data. Turning to the 
impact of public ownership, there is a wide acknowledgement in the literature that public and state owned 
corporations have a mixed range of objectives that can lead to weaker incentives for cost reduction, and this 
hypothesis is confirmed by these data.  
 
There are some lessons for the reform process in electricity generation from this research. First, countries 
have approached the market reform process differently. Inter-country heterogeneity is an important 
ingredient of the determination of generation costs, and therefore in reviewing lessons from international 
sample data, significant country differences must be expected. Second, leaving vertically integrated 
industries intact in the reform process reduces the ability to save generation costs – possibly because of the 
natural monopoly aspects of the downstream activities. Therefore, unbundling of the industry to create a 
separate generation sector is likely to enhance efficiency. Third, public and state ownership hinders the 
reduction in generation costs that can be achieved during periods of market reform. Privatisation appears to 
be a more efficient policy to pursue. The findings on scale economies in generation alone tell us that taking 
the quasi-fixed input into consideration, the cost elasticity of scale is 1.05 confirming that a competitive 
equilibrium in generation without the market power impact of economies of scale is feasible and will permit 
the unbundling of generation from transmission and distribution. 
 
Scale economies in power generation utilities are the measure of how costs change as the utilities expands 
all of its productive resources proportionately to provide increased generation. The elasticity of scale is 
reported in table 5 with  𝜀𝜀1 denoting the cost elasticity with respect to electricity generation,  𝜀𝜀2 is the cost 
elasticity with respect to emissions and 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗 represents the cost elasticity with respect to capital. Standard 
errors and significance tests were constructed using the delta method. We are interested in the difference 
between the unadjusted measure of scale economies 𝑟𝑟 and the measure adjusted for the quasi-fixed input 𝑟𝑟 ∗. 
Table 5:  Economies of Scale: Inverse of  cost elasticity of output vector 
Model 
   Unadjusted 
Panzar-Willig 
measure, r 
 
Adjusted Braeutigam-
Daughety measure r* 
 Test: 
unadjusted r 
= adjusted 
r* 
Test: 
adjusted 
r* = 1 
     [1/(𝜀𝜀1 +  𝜀𝜀2)] Standard     [(1- 𝜀𝜀k) /(𝜀𝜀1 +  𝜀𝜀2)] Standard p-value p-value 
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error error 
TFE    0.797 0.031        1.053 0.035 0.000 0.082 
 
The difference in the unadjusted Panzar-Willig versus Brauetigam-Daughety adjusted measures is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level so that allowing for the quasi-fixed input is important in 
discussing economies of scale. As we expected the unadjusted measure reflects the steep curvature of the 
short run cost function in this capital intensive industry.  The adjusted measure is, however, not significantly 
different from one at the 5 percent level of significance so that we conclude that at the sample mean the 
generation activity is showing constant returns to scale. 
Finally, we present a broad check of the link between market structure variables13 and the measured 
efficiency scores in Table 6. 
Table 6  
Pairwise correlations industrialization 
increased 
entry 
barriers 
increased 
vertical 
integration 
increased 
public 
ownership efficiency 
industrialization 1 
    increased entry barriers 0.2636* 1 
   increased vertical 
integration 0.1619* 0.3969* 1 
  increased public ownership 0.2501* 0.8495* 0.2971* 1 
 efficiency 0.0948* -0.1439* -0.0895* -0.1278* 1 
Note: * means statistically significant at the 5 per cent level 
 
We see that market reform indicators are themselves positively correlated – so that countries that  score 
poorly on entry barriers or vertical integration for example also score poorly on the other market reform 
indicators. In terms of the efficiency scores, more industrialized economies have a weak but significant 
correlation with stochastic efficiency, and countries that have worse (i.e. numerically higher) scores on 
market reform indicators have lower stochastic efficiency scores with this time the strongest effect from 
entry barriers. 
 
 
6  Conclusion and policy implication 
This study employs different stochastic frontier methods to estimate a short-run equilibrium model of 
electricity generation variable cost functions in which capital stock is treated as a quasi-fixed input.  This is 
applied to OECD electricity generation sectors while accounting for the impact of electricity market 
structures by using the published OECD product market reform indicators. Empirical models are developed 
                                                          
13 We exclude the overall market reform indicator from this table because the efficiency scores  are from the TFE model where 
its effect is submerged in the country-specific latent heterogeneity fixed effects 
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for the variable cost function as a translog form and analysed using panel data of 25 countries during the 
period 1980 to 2009. We use three main estimation models: Schmidt-Sickles (1984) fixed effects, Greene 
(2005) True fixed effects which includes country specific latent heterogeneity and  Kumbhakar, Lien and 
Hardakar (2014) four-way error component effects which accounts for time-invariant inefficiency by 
disentangling time-invariant (persistent) inefficiency from time-invariant heterogeneity. Our results show 
that cost efficiency scores as well as their ranking depends are sensitive to the choice of model specification. 
We find efficiency score from the Schmidt-Sickles fixed effects model to be much more lower than in other 
models as a result of treating unobserved country effects as inefficiency. The true fixed effects model is 
most successful since the additional time-invariant inefficiency component of the four-way model is 
negligible. The results reveal the underlying importance of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, and 
distinguishing it  from inefficiency.  
 
Our results show the significant influence of electricity market regulatory reform index on cost of electricity 
generation.  On one hand, public ownership and vertical integration are found to be associated with high 
efficiency loss while no statistically significant relationship established for entry barriers. This result 
reiterates the benefit of privatisation of generation assets and private ownership in power sector. Our results 
have important policy implications for the electricity market reform agenda. The nature of the deregulation 
matters since unbundling and privatization are the factors which encourage the generation utility to make 
maximum use of least cost options for efficiency gain. On the other hand, overall electricity market reform 
shows evidence of cost reduction only when unobserved heterogeneity is not treated separately from 
inefficiency.  
 
The estimated economies of output expansion for the models in the short run is about 0.8, indicating the 
existence of sharply rising costs when capacity is fixed. However, economies scale in the long run are 
measured at 1.05 – and not significantly different from 1, implying constant returns to scale when 
adjustment is made for the quasi-fixed input.. Thus, policymakers can create conditions that encourage more 
competition among generators in order to encourage investment in the industry since we find a high return to 
capital investment when we model the shadow price of the quasi-fixed capital input.   Finally we find that 
market reforms are positively correlated – a country pursuing one type of reform often pursues others as 
well – and that these market structure reforms as measured by the OECD product market reform indicators 
produce more cost-efficient electricity generation. 
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